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ON THE POTENTIAL OF ACTIVIST
DEMAND MANAGEMENT UNDER
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
by Peter Birch Sorensen
This paper argues that a tradeoff between output and anticipated infla-
tion is consistent with rational behavior of the private sector. A
Phillips curve embodying such a tradeoff is incorporated into a short
run macroeconomic model with rational expectations to demonstrate the
"real" effects of anticipated fiscal and monetary policies. The short
run effects of anticipated and unanticipated discretionary policies are
derived and the potential of systematic feedback rules for fiscal and
monetary policy is analyzed. Genuine countercyclical demand management
is found to be optimal for parameter values consistent with the tradi-
tional Keynesian view of the world.

1. The Current State of the Policy Neutrality Debate
A decade after it was first advanced, the proposition that system-
atic government demand management can have no impact on output and em-
ployment continues to be the subject of heated dispute among economists.
The most well-known statements of this policy ineffectiveness
proposition are those of Sargent and Wallace (1975), (1976) and Barro
(1976) , although the main conclusions of these papers had already been
drawn by Lucas (1972). The most important assumptions leading to the
policy neutrality postulates of these seminal contributions were the
following ones
:
(a) Expectations are "rational" in the sense that the subjective
probability distributions of economic variables estimated by economic
agents at time t coincide with the true objective probability distribu-
tions of these variables conditional upon all the information available
to the public at time t. In particular, this implies that the private
sector will detect any systematic stabilization policy rule and antic-
ipate its effects on the economy.
(b) The natural rate hypothesis (NRH) applies, i.e., the equilib-
rium rate of output and employment is independent of the equilibrium
rate of inflation.
(c) Wages and prices respond instantaneously to notional excess
demand so that all markets are continuously clearing. Together, (b)
and (c) imply that output can deviate from its "natural" level only
when the expected rate of inflation differs from the actual inflation
rate.
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(d) The information set available to the public is the same as
that available to policy-makers, that is the private sector knows just
as much about the structure of the economy, current economic trends
and the intentions of policy-makers as do the authorities themselves.
Of course the radical policy ineffectiveness postulate had to
provoke a counterattack from economists brought up in a Keynesian
tradition according to which the private sector can be and needs to be
stabilized. Thus criticisms have been raised against points (a)
,
(c)
and (d) above.
Benjamin Friedman (1979) has argued that economic agents—including
professional forecasters—cannot realistically be expected to know the
true structure of the economy. The hypothesis of rational expectations
involves two assumptions: (1) Private agents use efficiently whatever
information is available to them, and (2) the available information in-
cludes perfect knowledge of the economic structure. The latter assump-
tion ignores the fact that knowledge of the workings of the economy has
to be acquired through a time-consuming process of learning. During
the learning process there will be deviations between the estimated and
the true parameter values in a correctly specified model of the economy.
As a result there will be forecast errors, even if all the predeter-
mined variables—including government policy variables—are fully
known. These forecast errors will vary systematically with the mag-
nitude of the predetermined variables (Friedman, op. cit. pp. 29-30).
It follows that the amount of unanticipated inflation—and consequently
the deviation of output from its "natural" level—will depend inter
alia on anticipated government policy.
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One of the reasons why we shall probably never gain exact knowl-
edge of the economic structure is that this structure changes over
time. Whenever a structural shift has taken place due, say, to a major
institutional or technological change, rational forecasters should
revise their model of the economy. Generally, however, there is no
way of inferring the true parameter values of the new model from data
relating to the past. Depending on the particular method applied by
the economic agents to infer the new structure of the economy, the sys-
tem may or may not converge towards a new rational expectations equil-
ibrium in which expectations are consistent with the currently correct
model (Shiller, 1978, pp. 37-39). Even apart from possible problems of
instability, convergence may be so slow that the economy is never close
to a rational expectations equilibrium, since new structural changes
keep on occurring.
One might also point to the non-uniqueness problems associated
with some rational expectations models and discussed by Taylor (1977)
and Shiller (op. cit.). If the "true" model of the economy does not
yield a unique solution when agents base their expectations on their
knowledge of this model, how can individual agents make optimal fore-
casts?
In spite of these difficulties with the rational expectations
hypothesis, it has now become widely accepted, presumably because of
the lack of any convincing alternative theory of expectations forma-
tion. Instead many economists have directed their criticism against
the postulate that the economy can be usefully modelled "as if" all
markets are continuously clearing.
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Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979) have constructed rational expec-
tations models in which the existence of multi-period wage contracts
enable policy-makers to influence output and employment through a mone-
tary feed-back. rule. By reacting to stochastic (unforseeable) demand
and supply shocks which have occurred after some of the current wage
contracts were negotiated, the monetary authority can influence real
wages, the amount of unanticipated inflation and through these channels
the quantity of output supplied. Phelps and Taylor (1977) and Buiter
(1980) also present models in which prices do not adjust instantaneously
to notional excess demand, leaving room for anticipated, policy-induced
changes in nominal demand to affect quantities as well as prices. Even
a monetarist like Laidler (1981), who does not favor activist demand
management, has criticized the market clearing assumptions of Lucas,
Sargent, Wallace and Barro. He points to the various types of quantity
rationings occurring during business cycles as evidence that prices
rarely (if ever) assume their Walrasian equilibrium values.
Although there may still be disagreements whether and to what
extent assumption (d) is violated, all contributors to the rational
expectations literature are agree that policy-makers may in principle
exploit a possible information advantage to stablize output. If the
authorities can obtain and react to new information faster than the
private sector, systematic demand management can be used to offset the
various shocks impinging upon the economy. Taylor (1975) argues that
even though policy-makers may not know more about the structure of the
economy than the private sector, they are at least likely to be better
informed about their own intentions, i.e., about the policy-rule they
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apply. He shows that systematic monetary policy can have "real" effects
during the period until the private sector has figured out the monetary
policy rule from experience.
Anticipated stabilization policy may have beneficial "real" effects
in cases other than the ones mentioned above. Shiller (op. cit. pp.
12-13) notes that if there are significant non-linearities in some
behavioral economic relationships, these may be exploited for stabili-
zation purposes. He provides a specific example of a non-linear ra-
tional expectations model, in which complete stabilization of output
is possible.
The simple models embodying the policy neutrality proposition
usually assume the current price level to be unknown to investors at
the time of the investment decision. Turnovsky (1980) shows that if
instead one assumes the current price level to be fully known, the
monetary authority can ensure complete stabilization of output even
when all the assumptions (a) through (d) are met.
In the light of all these criticisms it seems hard to defend the
strong proposition that anticipated government demand management
generally leaves output and real interest rates unaffected. Still,
none of these criticisms provides any strong support for policy activ-
ism, as I shall now argue.
Ben Friedman is undoubtedly right in claiming that private economic
agents (including professional forecasters) do not in practice know the
true parameter values of the relevant model of the economy
—
probably
they do not even feel sure how the "relevant" model should be specified.
However, for policy-makers to be able to exploit the discrepancies
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between the estimated and the true parameter values for purposes of
systematic stabilization, they must know more than the private sector
about the true model of the economy. In other words, as Friedman him-
self recognizes (1979, p. 37), assumption (d) must be violated. It
may be that the authorities have superior information on at least their
own policy intentions, especially in a period following a change in the
policy regime, but in order to derive predictable stabilization effects
from this information advantage they must know precisely how their own
information differs from that of the public. Similarly, to take advan-
tage of the possible non-linearities mentioned by Shiller, policy-makers
would have to know the specific character of these non-linearities.
It is far from obvious that the authorities possess this knowledge.
Instead of trying to exploit possible information advantages through
activist demand management, it would seem more safe for policy author-
ities simply to share all their information with the public, including
information on their own policy plans. This would enable private
agents to make better inflation forecasts, thereby reducing unantici-
pated inflation and the ensuing deviations of output from its equilib-
rium trend level.
At first sight the model of Turnovsky would seem to provide a case
for policy activism. However, the strong non-neutrality implication of
this model rests crucially on the assumption that current investment ex-
penditure is a function of the current real interest rate. In the kind
of short run model appropriate for the analysis of short run stabiliza-
tion policy it is more reasonable to assume that current investment ex-
penditure is predominantly a result of investment decisions taken prior
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to the current period, and in that case Turnovsky's non-neutrality
proposition breaks down (this point is elaborated in Sections 3 and 4).
The strongest argument in favor of countercyclical demand manage-
ment is probably that which relies on the apparent failure of the price
mechanism to ensure continuous market clearing. Though I believe that
this argument carries considerable weight, the contributions of
McCallum (1978 and 1980) have shown that price stickiness in itself
does not necessarily invalidate the policy ineffectiveness proposition.
Buiter (op. cit.), who is very critical of the policy neutrality view,
satisfies himself with the fact that "... it is very simple to con-
struct quite plausible models with sluggish wage or price adjustment
that do leave scope for real effects of deterministic monetary and
fiscal policy" (p. 45). Still, given our present ignorance about
actual wage and price formation, what one economist considers a "plau-
sible" model of wage-price behavior might be considered implausible
by another. Until we know whether a Buiter-type or a McCallum-type
model of the wage-price sector is the more realistic one, we cannot be
sure that systematic demand management has significant real effects,
provided we feel compelled to accept the NRH which is embodied in both
types of models
.
At present it thus seems that one would have to argue against the
NRH to provide a convincing case for policy activism. This paper at-
tempts to do so by restating some criticisms of the NRH developed at
length elsewhere (Sorensen, 1982, a and b) , and by incorporating a
"Keynesian" Phillips curve into a simple macroeconomic model with
rational expectations to show the potential of activist stabilization
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policy. To my knowledge none of the authors engaged in the policy-
neutrality debate are currently challenging the NRH—at least this
hypothesis has been embodied in all the formal models developed during
the debate. There are probably several reasons for this:
First, it is widely believed that invalidity of the NRH must imply
the existence of some kind of money illusion, and of course it would be
highly inconsistent to introduce such irrational behavior into a model
where expectations are formed rationally.
Second, the NRH is analytically convenient in formal models, and
this may have tempted many authors to accept it in the absence of any
strong theoretical arguments against it.
Third, it may seem intuitively obvious that the policy-neutrality
proposition will break down if the NRH is invalid, and the need for a
formal demonstration of this result may not have been felt.
Still, if there is no unique "natural" rate of unemployment, it
seems worthwhile to ask exactly what activist stabilization policy can
achieve under such circumstances. A simple macro model with rational
expectations is set up below to analyze this question. At first, how-
ever, we must seek to justify our dismissal of the NRH.
2. The Natural Rate Hypothesis Reconsidered
This section gives a brief and simplified restatement of some
arguments against the NRH, which I have spelled out in detail elsewhere,,
In Sorensen (1982a) I set up' a model of an atomistic labor market
where wage rates are set by individual firms and workers are "wage
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takers." The behavior of workers employed by the ith firm is governed
by the variable
Rj = wj/[(l-u
t
)W^ + u
t
B
t
] (2.1)
where W is the wage rate offered by the ith firm, u is the unemploy-
e
ment rate, W is the expected average wage rate in the labor market and
B is the (hourly) rate of unemployment compensation, all variables
relating to "year" t. The denominator of (2.1) is the expected income
for the average worker in year t, given prevailing employment oppor-
tunities, and R is thus a measure of the relative earnings offered by
the ith firm. Unemployment benefits are assumed to adjust to actual
wage development with a lag, so that B = aW
1
,
where W is the
actual average wage rate in the preceding year, and a is a policy-
determined constant.
It is argued that , ceteris paribus, the ith firm will experience
lower costs of labor turnover and higher labor productivity, the higher
the value of R . Further, it is shown that cost minimization requires
the firm to set its wage rate so that R = K, where K is a constant the
magnitude of which depends on the parameters of the functions relating
turnover costs and productivity to R . Now, let the ith firm be a
representative one, implying that W = W for all t. Moreover, define
the actual rate of wage inflation as w = (W -W ) /W and the ex-
pected rate as w = (W -W
1
) /W . We may then write
The model shares many characteristics with that of Phelps (1968),
2
This definition assumes that last year's wage level is fully
known in the current year.
-10-
R* = tl+w
t
)/[(l-U
t
)(Hv®) + u
t
a] = K (2.2)
Assume that we start out from an equilibrium situation in which
e e
w = w , and let w rise by some amount X. It is easy to see from
t t* t
(2.2) that the representative firm will then need to raise its rate of
wage increase w by less than X to keep relative earnings at their con-
stant optimum value K. To restore equality between w and w , u would
thus have to fall , thereby inducing a further rise in w . In other
words, in equilibrium a higher rate of wage inflation would be associated
with a lower rate of unemployment. This result obviously contradicts
the NRH, according to which only one unemployment rate is compatible
with equilibrium. The existence of a time lag in the adjustment of
unemployment benefits to changes in the wage level is sufficient to
produce a long run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. The
NRH can be shown to be valid in the special case of instantaneous and
proportionate adjustment of benefits to wage changes, but that case
seems empirically unrealistic.
In another paper I have tried to develop a model of wage and price
determination in an imperfectly competitive world with unions and
3
oligopolistic and monopolistic firms (Sorensen, 1982b). The rate of
wage inflation in the basic model of the paper is given by the equation
(Wi)/wt-i = nt (wt"wt-i>/wt-i' ° -° (2,3)
The model is inspired by that of Turnovsky and Pitchford (1978).
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where W is again the actual average money wage , W is the money wage
demanded by unions and n is the rate of employment, which is always be-
tween zero and one. (2.3) thus postulates that actual wage inflation
is some fraction n of the percentage wage increase demanded by unions,
with this fraction varying positively with excess demand for labor,
proxied by the employment rate. The rate of price inflation is
(Vpt-i)/pt-i = n t (ptD- pt-i)/pt-i' i ^ ° (2 - 4)
where P is the actual price level and P is the target price of the
representative oligopolistic firm. With a rise in the employment rate,
excess capacity will generally fall and firms will find it easier to
realize their target prices. This is the rationale for (2.4).
The paper then proceeds to specify equations for W and P . It
is assumed that target wages and prices reflect a desire of workers
and firms to obtain a certain level of real wages and real profits,
respectively, and that these real income claims vary positively with
the employment rate. Thus there is no money illusion in the model.
It is then shown that a higher employment rate generally implies a
higher equilibrium inflation rate. The NRH will hold only when the
parameters a and y are both equal to zero, so that target wages and
prices are always realized. This must be considered an unlikely
special case which would seem to require an extreme degree of monopoly
in the markets for goods and labor.
To sum up: The existence of a downward sloping long run Phillips
curve does not seem to rely on money illusion in the private sector.
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3. A Simple Model of Price and Output Interactions
We are now ready to analyze the potential of activist demand
management under rational expectations. For this purpose, we shall
employ the following short run model
Y
t
= aY
t
" b[rt-r (t-lVPt-l)] + Gt + ult» < a < 1 (3.1)
M
t "
M
t-i - Pt "
P
t-1
+ a<VW " B<Wl> + U2t (3 - 2)
P
t
- P
t_ 1
= r, + Y(Y
t
-Y) + Ut_1P*-Pt_1) + u3t , < X < 1 (3.3)
G
t
= gt
+ 6(Y-Y
t_1
) (3.4)
M
t
- M
t_1
- m
t
+ U(Y-Y
t-1)
(3.5)
where
Y = real output
Y = full employment level of real output
G = real government consumption
m
r = nominal interest rate
M = nominal money supply, measured in logarithms
P = price level, measured in logarithms
,X = expectation of variable X, held at time t-1 for time t
We have chosen signs so that all parameters are positive. Equation
(3.1) is our IS curve. It is fairly standard, except perhaps that we
take private sector demand to vary negatively with last period's real
interest rate (the term in the square bracket) and not with the current
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rate. We shall discuss this specification in detail in a moment.
Equation (3.2) is a dynamic version of the equilibrium condition for
the money market. It is simply the first difference of the static
equilibrium condition M - P = to + aY - Br + z„ , where
u2t ~ z2r
~ z
2t--l*
Following Turnovsky (1980), we have measured the
money supply and the price level in logarithms. This is purely for
convenience, in order to avoid the linearization which would otherwise
be necessary. (3.3) is a simple, expectations-augmented Phillips curve.
The parameter n captures possible "cost-push" inflation, but it is in-
essential to our general conclusions that it be strictly positive.
The assumption that A falls short of unity of course reflects our
4break with the NRH. Relations (3.4) and (3.5) hypothesize that
government expenditure and monetary growth are increased (decreased)
to the extent that last period's output fell short of (exceeded) its
full employment level. The assumption of lagged policy responses is
justified by the recognition, decision and implementation lags inherent
in the political process. It also reflects our wish to avoid assigning
an information advantage to government. The exogenous variables g and
m caputure "discretionary" fiscal and monetary policies. The random
disturbances u. and u
2t.
reflect stochastic shifts in the demand for
4
Actually the models referred to in the preceding section both
imply the Phillips curve to be nonlinear. (3.3) is thus a linear
approximation adopted to keep the whole system linear.
Most recent empirical studies (e.g., Fields and Noble, 1981) sug-
gest a value of X insignificantly different from one. My 1982 papers
argue that these estimates of A are upward biased because the explan-
atory variables of the regression equations do not include tax rates
and unemployment compensation, which can be shown to be inflationary
within the framework of my models.
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goods and real balances, respectively, and u_ caputres random supply
shocks. Following convention, we assume all the u's to have zero
means, finite variances and covariances , and to be independently dis-
tributed over time. Government expenditures and the money supply are
assumed to be perfectly controllable, a simplifying but— for our
purposes—inessential assumption.
There has been some disagreement over the proper specification of
the real interest rate in models like the present one. Denoting the
real interest rate in period t by £ , some authors like Sargent and
Wallace (1975) and MacCallum (1980) employ the definition
* *£_=r^- ( -P ,, - . , P ). Investment decisions in period t are thus
t t t-1 t+1 t-1 t
assumed to be based on inflationary expectations formed at the end of
period t-1. In other words it is postulated that whereas the nominal
interest rate is fully known at the time of the investment decisions,
the current price level is not. Turnovsky (1980, pp. 42-43) finds this
postulate to be inconsistent with the standard assumption that the
demand for money depends on the actual rather than the expected price
*
level, and consequently he adopts the specification I = r - ( tpt+i~pt )
Minford and Peel (1981) argue that the inconsistency pointed out by
Turnovsky is imaginary. One needs only assume that the transactions
demand for money is based on the actual prices observed by individual
agents. On aggregation one then obtains a money demand function in
which the actual aggregate price level appears. In an economy where
agents have current information only on the local prices they observe
rather than on the general price level, one ends up with a Sargent-
Wallace specification of the real interest rate along with a traditional
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money demand function, according to Minford and Peel. This argument
seems flawed, however. What determines the profitability of the in-
vestment project of an individual firm is not the development of the
general price level, but rather the change of the price of the firm's
own product. The investment decision of the ith firm will therefore
i* idepend on the variable r - ( P . , - ?,.)> w^ere the term in the bracket
is (approximately) equal to the expected percentage increase in the
price of the firm's product. Aggregating over firms we arrive at
*
Turnovsky s specification £ = r - ( P ,,-P._), although via a dif-
ferent route than his.
Using this specification of I in a simple macro model, Turnovsky
showed that proper monetary policy parameters can ensure complete
stabilization of output even if the NRH is valid (X=l) and the govern-
ment has no information advantage. While this result seriously ques-
tions the robustness of the policy neutrality proposition, it would
also seem to undermine the importance of the NRH for that proposition.
However, Turnovsky 's result depends critically on current demand for
goods being a function of the current real interest rate. Though
very common, this assumption is unrealistic in a model dealing with
short run stabilization policy, given the considerable lags in the
investment process documented by Mayer (1960) and Hall (1977).
Summing up these findings, Kydland and Prescott (1980, p. 176) con-
clude that "... only a small fraction of additions to capital stock
that are decided upon in a given year show up as investment expen-
ditures in the same year. Most of the expenditures will be incurred
Remember that prices are measured in logarithms.
-16-
during the next year, with a not insignificant fraction being left
over for the subsequent year." This is the rationale for our IS curve
(3.1). It would be easy to include more than a one-period invest-
ment lag by letting aggregate demand depend on the real interest rates
of several past periods, but that would only complicate the exposition
without affecting our conclusions on short run policy effects.
Our model still misses an equation describing the formation of
inflationary expectations. Assuming these to be rational, this equa-
tion is derived by substituting (3.4) into (3.1), solving for Y and
inserting the resulting expression into (3.3) to get
P
t
- P
t_ x
- [Y/(l-a)Hg
t
+ 5(T.Vl) - b[rt-1 - C^VP^)] + uu }
n - yY + U^-Vi) + u3t
Taking expectations of this expression conditional upon all infor-
mation available up through period t-1, we then find the expected rate
of inflation to be
t-l
P
t
" Pt-1
= {ri(1"a) + Y[ t-lgt
+ (5" 1^)?
"
6Vl
- br
t_ 1
]}/[(l-X)(l-a) - Yb] (3.6)
The recursive structure of our model is now clear: Given last
period's interest rate and the expected level of autonomous government
Brems (1982, pp. 77-80) also provides evidence of a one year lag
between the real interest rate (measured by the common stock yield) and
private investment.
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expenditure,
t_ 1 gt
» equations (3.6), (3.4) and (3.1) determine current
output, which is then inserted into (3.3) along with (3.6) to give the
current inflation rate. With monetary growth being dictated by last
period's output according to (3.5), the monetary equilibrium condition
(3.2) finally determines the current interest rate, given the growth
of output and prices.
Assuming for the moment that g and m are kept constant so that
* — _
gt
= ,g = g and m = m, we can reduce the system (3.1) through (3.6)
to the following difference equation in output:
Y
t+2
+ C
l
Y
t+l
+ C
2
Y
t =
C + ult+2
+
™t+l (3 ' 7)
(^ = {(1-A)[b(a+Y) + 3(6-l+a)] + Yb(X+6)}/90
C
2
= (l-X)fb(u-a) - 66]/63
C
Q
= b[(l-X)(m-haY) + YY - n]/se
9 = (l-X)(l-a) - yb
v 5 [(9e-YXb)/9B, b(l-X)/98, b(l-X)/9g]
u
t "
Cult'
u
2t»
u
3t ]
7
A mathematical appendix giving a detailed derivation of the
results of this paper are available from the author on request.
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where u - is the transpose of the vector u - . The necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for stability are
1 + C
±
+ C
2
> (3.8)
1 " Cl
+ C
2
>
° (3,9)
1 - C
2
> (3.10)
Using the definitions stated in (3.7), condition (3.8) is found to
imply that
b[Y+u(l-X)]/6[(l-X)(l-a)-yb] > (3. 8. a)
If monetary policy is indeed countercyclical (u > 0), (3. 8. a)
requires that (1-X) (1-a) > yb. In other words, the responsiveness of
prices to excess supply (y) and the sensitivity of investment to in-
terest rates (b) must be "low." These requirements are in accordance
with the traditional "Keynesian" view of the world and would seem to
fit well in with our "Keynesian" Phillips curve (3.3). The parameter
a, which is the marginal propensity to consume out of pretax income,
may be influenced by tax policy. Under a simple proportional income
tax system we have a = d(l-r), where d is the marginal propensity to
consume out of disposable income, and T is the tax rate. In conformity
with standard theory, we thus find the likelihood of stability to be
greater, the higher the tax rate. In the policy analysis below, we
shall assume the stability condition (3. 8. a) to be met. In Section 5
we shall return to the stability problem and show that government can
always ensure stability by an appropriate choice of policy parameters.
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4. Short Run Policy Effects
Before turning to the problem of optimum stabilization policies,
let us analyze the short run impact of discretionary fiscal and monetary
policies. Substituting (3.4) into (3.1) and (3.5) into (3.2) and using
* u u
the definition g =
1
g + g , where g denotes the unanticipated
g
component of g , our model may be rewritten as follows:
•a u
Cl-a)Y
t
" \.^t = t.l8t + 8t + 6(7^) - br^ + «u .
t-l^t
5
t-l
P
t
" Pt-1
(A
- 1}
«T
t
+ P
t
- 8r
t
= m
t
+ U(Y-Yt-1) + aY^ - 8*^ - u2t ,
P
t
I P
t
- P^ (4.2)
YY
t
" P
t
+ X
t-l
P
t
= YY - n - u3t
(4.3)
t-l
P
t
= {n(1_a) + Y[ t-l8t
+ (5~1+a)Y
"
5Y
t-l " brt-l ]}/0 (4,4)
We can now apply Cramer's rule to the above linear system to solve
•*
for Y , r , P and _P in terms of the lagged endogenous variables,
the policy parameters and the random demand and supply shocks. From
these solutions one finds the impact effect of discretionary fiscal
policy to be
Q
The reason why we do not yet distinguish between anticipated and
unanticipated money will be clear in a moment.
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3Y
t
/9
t-lgt
=
<1_X)/9 > ° C4.5)
3Y
t/3g^
= l/(l-a) > (4.6)
OY
t
/3
t_1
g*)
- (3Y
t /3gJ)
= Yb/6(l-a) > (4.7)
ViV 3t-igt = Y/e > ° (A ' 8)
9
t-l
P
t
/9g
t
=
° (4 - 9)
3P
t
/3
t-l gt
= y/9 > ° (4.10)
3V 3gt = Y/d-a) > (4.11)
(3P
t
/3
t-lgt } " <*V 38? = Y[X(l-a)+Yb]/9(l-a) > (4.12)
3r
t
/3
t-lgt
= [a(1-X) + Y]/S9 > ° (4 -13 )
3r
t
/3g
t
=
(a+Y)/S(l-a) > (4.14)
(3r
t
/3
t-lgt } '
(3r
t
/3g
t
) = Y[X(1_a) +b(a+y)]/e(l-a)9 > (4.15)
In signing the multipliers where 9 = (1-X) (1-a) - y& appears, we
have invoked the Samuelsonian correspondence principle s noting from
(3. 8. a) that stability requires 9 to be positive. Relation (4.5) shows
that a fully anticipated increase in government expenditure is expan-
«
sionary to the extent that the NRH is invalid (X < 1). (4.6) is
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identical to the conventional multiplier from the static Keynesian
model of basic textbooks. Our model shows it to be a first-period
multiplier applying only to unanticipated changes in government ex-
penditure. According to (4.7) government should announce its intention
to increase g well in advance, if it wishes to maximize the expan-
sionary impact of rising expenditures. Relations (4.8) and (4.9) pro-
vide the explanation for this: Contrary to an unexpected rise in g ,
an anticipated rise in government demand will raise the expected infla-
tion rate for period t, thereby driving down the real interest rate in
period t-1 and boosting investment in period t. This result contrasts
sharply with standard "natural rate theory," according to which only
unanticipated changes in g can affect output, whereas anticipated
changes merely affect nominal income. However, we see from (4.12) that
a fully foreseen rise in g will in fact be more inflationary than
an unexpected one, due to its greater expansionary effect on output and
its positive impact on inflationary expectations. For similar reasons
the anticipated rise in government demand will also have a larger posi-
tive effect on nominal interest rates, as shown in (4.15).
Turning now to monetary policy we first note from (3.1) that the
ability of the monetary authority to influence output depends on its
ability to control the real interest rate. Obviously current changes
in money growth cannot affect current output, since aggregate demand
depends on last period's real interest rate. For the same reason the
much celebrated distinction between anticipated and unanticipated
money is irrelevant in the present -model. A monetary expansion, whether
or not it comes as a surprise, changes the current interest rate but has
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no immediate impact on output and inflation, due to the lagged response
of investment to interest rates. Thus there is always time for the
public to adjust their inflationary expectations to unexpected as well
as expected changes in interest rates before these exert their influ-
ence on demand. With this in mind we find that
3r /3m = -1/6 < (4.16)
3
t
p
t+i
/3m
t
= (8
t
p
t+i
/3r
t
) x ( 9rt
/3V = Yb/6e > ° (4 ' 17)
3*
t
/3m
t
= (3r
t
/3m
t
) - oX+l^V = (*"D 0--a)/B8 < (4.18)
3Y
t+1
/3m
t
=
-b(3£
t
/3m
t
)/(l-a) = b(l-X)/68 > (4.19)
3P
t+1
/3m
t
= Y(3Y
t+1
/3m
t
) + *O
t
P*
+1
/3n
t
) = Yb/86 > (4.20)
From (4.18) and (4.19) we see how the "real" effects of monetary
policy depend critically on invalidity of the NRH (X < 1). The above
relations also show that monetary policy becomes impotent in the
limiting case of the "liquidity trap," where 6 tends to infinity.
The reader may doubt that 9 = (1-X) (1-a) - yb is in fact positive.
When it is negative, the system will be unstable for u > 0, and the
short run effects of anticipated policies will be "perverse," according
9
to relations (4.5) through (4.20). However, the probability of
9
When the NRH applies (X=l), we obviously have instability,
according to (3. 8. a). This is a common problem in rational expecta-
tions models incorporating the NRH. Usually it is "solved" by re-
sorting to the ad hoc procedure of simply imposing stability on the
sytem by leaving out the unstable components (roots) of the solutions
for the endogenous variables.
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"normal" responses to policy changes is increased if we introduce a
real balance effect into our model to allow for the possibility of
direct substitution between money and goods and for the impact of
changes in base money on net private wealth. For simplicity we shall
ignore the existence of a banking sector and treat all money as "out-
side money." Our modified IS curve may then be written as
Y
t
= aYt "
b(r
t-i " t-iV + Gt + h(Mt-V + uit (4 - 21)
Substituting (3.4) and (3.5) into (4.21) and using the definitions
* u u
P = P + P
1
and m -
t _-,
m
-
r
+ m » where m is the unanticipated
component of discretionary monetary growth, we get
Y
t
= aYt- b(rt-i- t-iV + t-ih + h +
h[
t-imt
+ m
t
+ ^-w + Vi - K - pt-i ] + ^t (4 - 22)
To derive the expected inflation rate, we insert (4.22) into the
Phillips curve (3.3), take conditional expectations as of time t-1 and
rearrange to find
t-l
P
t
= ^-aX^Y) + Yl^jg* + (6+uh) (Y-Y^) - br^
+ h(
t_ 1
m* + M
t_1
- P^^D/O+yh) (4.23)
The monetary equilibrium condition (4.2) may be rewritten as
aY
t
+ P
t
" 6r
t
=
t-l
m
t
+ m
t
+
"^W + aYt-l ~ 6rt-l " U2t (4 ' 24)
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The model consisting of (4.22) through (4.24) plus the Phillips
curve (3.3) may then be solved to get
3Y
t
/8
t-l8t
=
(1
- X^( e+Yh > > ° (4 - 25 )
9Y
t
/3g
t
= 1/ (1"a+Yh > > ° . (4.26)
(3Y
t
/3
t-lgt } "
(3Y
t
/3g
t
} = Y(b-Xh)/(9+Yh)(l-a+Yh) (4.27)
SY
t
/3
t_im
*
= h(l-X)/(6+Yh) > (4.28)
3Y
t
/3m" = h/d-a+yh) > (4.29)
(3Y
t
/3t-lV " (3Yt/3mt )
= Yh(b-Xh)/(9+yh)(l-a+Yh) (4.30)
(3P
t
/3
t-lSt ) " ^V*8? = Y[X(1"a) + Yb]/(8+Yh)(l-a+Yh) > (4.31)
(3P„/9 fc -m) - OP^/Sm") = yh[X(l-a)+rb]/(0+Yh) (1-a+rh) > (4.32)t t-1 t t t
As seen from (4.28) and (4.29), the distinction between anticipated
and unanticipated money has now become important, because current real
balances have an immediate impact on demand. Comparing (4.25) to (4.5)
and (4.28) to (4.19) we see that introduction of a real balance effect
increases the likelihood of a positive response of output to anticipated
fiscal and monetary expansion, and the same can be shown to be true for
the response of inflation and interest rates. In signing the above
multipliers we have assumed that 9 + yh is in fact positive, which does
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not necessarily require our earlier assumption of 9 > to hold. From
a comparison of (4.25) and (4.26) to (4.5) and (4.6) it is seen that
fiscal expansions have a smaller positive impact on output when the
real balance effect is active. The reason is that the inflationary
impact of a fiscal expansion erodes real balances, with a consequential
negative wealth effect on private demand.
It is interesting to note from (4.27) and (4.30) that one cannot
predict which of the two kinds of fiscal and monetary expansion
—
anticipated or unanticipated expansion—will have the greater impact
on output. Relations (4.31) and (4.32) provide the clue to the ex-
planation: By being more inflationary, an anticipated fiscal or
monetary expansion implies a greater "inflation tax" on real balances
than an unanticipated one. This effect is contractionary and is cap-
tured by the term -Xh in the numerator of (4.27) and (4.30). On the
other hand, in contrast to an unanticipated rise in G or M , an
anticipated one drives down the real interest rate through its impact
on inflationary expectations, thereby stimulating investment. This ex-
pansionary effect is reflected by the presence of b in the numerators
of (4.27) and (4.30). A priori one cannot say which of the two effects
will dominate. This is another case where our model conflicts with
natural rate theory. In the case of the NRH (X=l) relations (4.27)
and (4.28) reduce to
(3Y
t
/3g£) - C3Y
t
./a
t
._1
g*) = l/U-a+yh) > (4. 27. a)
(3Y
t
/3mp - C3Y
t
/3t-1mt )
= h/(l-a+yh) > (4. 30. a)
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The empirical work of Barro (1977 and 1978) suggests that
u *
3Y /3m > 3Y /3 m . From (4. 27. a) we see this to be consistent with
the NRH, but according to (4.30) it is also consistent with our
"Keynesian" model if Ah > b, i.e., if investment is relatively insen-
sitive to real interest rates.
Finally, let us note that A = 1 implies
3Vl/9t-lmt = " St-lPt /3t-lmt = h/(h_b) * ° (4.33)
Thus, even on his own natural rate premises, the conclusion of
Friedman (1968, p. 11) that the monetary authority cannot use its con-
trol over a nominal variable to peg a "real" variable does not hold
when the real balance effect is active. The real interest rate I
is real!
5. Minimum Variance Stabilization Policies
We now return to the simple model (3.1) through (3.6) summarized
in the stochastic difference equation (3.7). Provided the system is
stable, the solution to (3.7) is
Actually Barro f s tests provided further support for the NRH,
since he could not reject the hypothesis that 31/8,1 = 0. How-
ever, attention should be drawn to the fundamental critique of Barro's
methodology raised by Blinder and Gordon in Fisher (ed. , 1980, pp.
49-63)
.
This was recognized long ago by Sargent (1973, p. 443) and
has recently been demonstrated by Brems (1982, chap. 4) within the
framework of a long run "monetarist" growth model.
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t t
t"1
Y =Y + k w + k w + Z n.z , (5.1)
x z j=o JtJ
Y* = CQ/d+C^+Cj), 2
t
= u
lt
+ vu^r
1. = (wj+1 - wJ +1)/(W;L-w2 )
where w
1
and w are the characteristic roots of (3.7) and k- and k
?
are constants determined by the initial conditions Y_. and Y-. Assume
(naively?) that policy makers take the long view and wish to choose the
stabilization parameters 5 and u so as to minimize the asymtotic vari-
ance of output given by
lim a2 (t) = E[(Y
t
-Y^) 2 ] (5.2)
t-x»
Here E denotes the expectation operator and Y = Y + k.w + &2W 9
12
is the expected value of output at time t. Using the method des-
cribed by Bartlett (19 78) one finds from (3.7) that
lim aj(t) = <^(1+C
2
)/(1-C
2
)[(1+C
2
)
2
- C
2
] (5.3)
2
where a is of course the variance of z . Asymptotic output variance
Z C
cannot be reduced to zero by choosing policy parameters so that C- = -1,
since one of the stability conditions (3.8) and (3.9) would then be
12
Remember from our assumptions about the u-terms that E[z ] =
for all t. Note, also, that Y = Y asymptotically, since the system
is assumed to be stable. Thus, the goal of policy makers is to minimize
the long run variability of Y around the equilibrium value Y .
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violated. Given this restriction, the values of C. and CL which
minimize (5.3) turn out to be C. s C. = 0. In other words, the
authorities should choose policy parameters so as to offset the auto-
regressive structure of the system. In that case the stability condi-
tions (3.8) through (3.10) will obviously be met, and Y* = Y for all
t. Prom the definitions of G. and C_ stated in (3.7) the values of 6
and \i satisfying C. = C„ = are found to be
5 » 1 - a - (b/S)<a+y) - Yb[(X/6) + 1]/(1-X) (5.5)
u = 6(6/b) + a (5.6)
It is interesting to note from (5.5) and (5.6) that the optimum
values of 6 and u are not necessarily positive. This is not really
surprising, considering our assumption that monetary and fiscal feed-
back policies can be implemented only with a time lag. If the economy
is hit by an expansionary shock in period t driving up Y above Y, it
may be that inherent cyclical forces are making for a reversal of the
output movement in period t + 1. Thus, if policy makers respond to
the positive deviation of Y from Y by implementing contractionary
policies in the following period, this may well add to total output
variance and cause Y ._ to undershoot equilibrium output. However,
in the limiting case of the liquidity trap, we find from (5.5) that
lim 6 = [(l-X)(l-a)-Yb]/(l-X) = 6/(l-X) (5.7)
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Recalling the discussion of Section 4, we see from (5.7) and (5.6)
that the optimum values of <$ and u will be positive (9 > 0) under the
same "Keynesian" circumstances which will ensure a "normal" short run
response of output and inflation to discretionary fiscal and monetary
policy. The Keynesian recommendation of genuine countercyclical sta-
bilization policies is thus consistent with the traditional Keynesian
view that the interest sensitivity of money demand (8) is high, that
there is a long run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment (X
significantly below one) and that the interest sensitivity of invest-
ment (b) and the response of prices to excess supply (y) are low,
since all these factors make for positive optimum values of 6 and u.
Since the inflation rate varies with excess demand Y - Y, one
would expect that the policy parameters minimizing output variance
will also minimize the asymptotic variance of inflation. In fact, the
system (3.1) through (3.6) can be reduced to
P
t+2
+ C
l
P
t+l
+ C
2
P
t " P0
+ X
t+2>
(5 ' 8)
pQ
= b[y(m+uY) + u(n-YY]/S9
where x „ is a linear combination of (u 2 » ut+i » ut^ witn the co-
efficients depending on the parameters of the model. From (5.8) the
asymptotic variance of inflation is found to be
2 2 2
a (1+C
2
)/(1-C
2 )
[(1+CL) - C ], and this variance—like that of output-
is minimized when CL = C„ = 0. Thus there is no tradeoff between
the variability of output and inflation although there is, of course,
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a tradeoff between the mean values of these two variables, due to the
Phillips curve (3.3).
It is natural to assume that the authorities wish to minimize the
variance of output around its full-employment level. Under a minimum
variance policy the mean value of Y will be Y = C_, according to
(5.1). Given the definition of C stated in (3.7) and the minimum
* —
variance policy parameters (5.5) and (5.6), the condition Y = CL = Y
will be met when monetary policy makers choose autonomous monetary
growth m so that
m = n/(l-X) (5.9)
With the minimum-variance full-employment policies (5.5), (5.6)
and (5.9), the mean value of inflation determined by (5.8) becomes
P = n/(l-X) = m. For full employment to be compatible with price
stability the Phillips curve parameter n must thus be zero. This
would seem to require the absence of cost push inflation and of the
"sectorinflation" described by Tobin (1972) , according to whom the
continuous random shifts in the composition of total demand are infla-
tionary on average because of an asymmetric response of wages and
prices to excess supply and demand in individual industries.
6. Summary
This paper has argued that although anticipated government demand
management can probably affect output even if the NRH is valid, a suc-
cessful exploitation of such nonneutrality for purposes of systematic
output stabilization requires either that the government possess some
information advantage or that short run wage and price rigidities assume
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a specific form which will be reasonably stable over time. Given our
present ignorance about the structure of the economy in general and
the forms and causes of wage and price stickiness in particular, one
would therefore have to show that the NRH is unrealistic to provide a
convincing case for policy activism. We tried to do so by sketching
models of competitive and noncompetitive wage and price determination
that produce a tradeoff between the equilibrium rates of inflation and
unemployment without relying on money illusion in the private sector.
This tradeoff was then incorporated into a simple macroeconomic model
with rational expectations and feed-back rules for fiscal and monetary
policy. Within this framework we showed that anticipated fiscal and
monetary policies will definitely have "real" effects. In our basic
model the short run (first period) response of output and inflation to
anticipated expansionary policies was seen to be positive for parameter
values consistent with the traditional Keynesian view of the world.
With the introduction of a real balance effect the likelihood of posi-
tive fiscal and monetary multipliers was found to increase, and anti-
cipated money was shown to affect the real interest rate even if the
NRH were valid. Returning to our basic model, we saw that government
can always ensure stability and minimize the long run variability of
output and inflation around their full-employment levels by appropriate
activist stabilization policy rules. However, in the presence of lags
in the implementation of policy, genuine countercyclical demand manage-
ment was found to be optimal only in a rather "Keynesian" environment.
Compatibility of the twin goals of full employment and price stability
was found to be an unlikely special case.
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Of course, none of these conclusions should be taken too literally,
since they were derived from a simplified ad hoc model. Furthermore,
even if the Phillips curve linking anticipated inflation to unemploy-
ment is downward sloping, it may indeed be very steep. Output varia-
tions induced by anticipated demand management may therefore be asso-
ciated with very large variations of inflation. With respect to the
possibility of buying a short run increase in output at a "reasonably"
low inflation cost, the rational expectations revolution—as well as
practical experience—has certainly taught us to be more pessimistic
than we used to be in- the heyday of Keynesianism. Activist demand
management is hardly obsolete, but its potential is smaller than once
believed.
-33-
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